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Abstract
The Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa was unprecedented in both its scale and impact. 
Out of this human calamity has come renewed attention to global health security—its definition, 
meaning, and the practical implications for programmes and policy. For example, how does a 
government begin to strengthen its core public health capacities, as demanded by the International 
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Health Regulations? What counts as a global health security concern? In the context of the 
governance of global health, including WHO reform, it will be important to distil lessons learned 
from the Ebola outbreak. The Lancet invited a group of respected global health practitioners to 
reflect on these lessons, to explore the idea of global health security, and to offer suggestions for 
next steps. Their contributions describe some of the major threats to individual and collective 
human health, as well as the values and recommendations that should be considered to counteract 
such threats in the future. Many different perspectives are proposed. Their common goal is a more 
sustainable and resilient society for human health and wellbeing.
The true scope of health security
David L Heymann
Health security—essentially the protection from threats to health—is recognised as one of 
the most important non-traditional security issues.1–5 As the Ebola virus crosses national 
borders, there is clear understanding that the outbreaks in west Africa are a threat to our 
health security—people with infection have travelled across borders within Africa and to 
Europe and to North America where they have unintentionally caused small chains of 
transmission far from the epicentre of the outbreak. The Ebola crisis has put the spotlight on 
the importance of reducing the vulnerability of societies to infectious disease threats that 
spread across national borders. This aspect of health security—collective health security—
has been the focus of attention and the commonly understood conceptualisation of health 
security for centuries. The paradigm today is rapid detection of these events, and rapid 
response. But there is a second, equally important aspect to health security that is less 
appreciated that the west Africa Ebola outbreaks have also tragically highlighted: individual 
health security. This is security that comes from access to safe and effective health services, 
products, and technologies. Ebola-infected health workers from developed countries have 
been repatriated from west Africa for care in their own countries where there is health 
security for individuals—hospitals that provide safe and effective access to life-saving 
medicines and services. Meanwhile, Ebola-infected west Africans have had to accept that 
health care is not always safe, not always effective, and not always accessible—that their 
own health security is yet again at risk. As the Ebola epidemic has unfolded, the part that has 
been played by substandard infection control and inadequate access to effective health 
products and services has clearly demonstrated a wider scope of health security—the 
intertwining of collective and individual health security.
The concept of collective health security against infectious diseases was already clear in the 
14th century when quarantine was first used in an attempt to prevent bubonic plague from 
crossing borders. As international travel and trade increased, a series of international treaties 
and conventions were developed to attempt to stop the cross-border spread of plague and 
three additional infectious diseases—cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever.6 In 1969 the 
International Health Regulations set out a collaborative global framework to enhance the 
world’ s health security against these four infectious diseases with a reporting requirement 
and predetermined actions to be implemented at borders.7,8
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After the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and the strong 
reminder that border controls cannot stop the international spread of disease, the 
International Health Regulations were broadened in scope.9 They now require reporting of 
any public health emergency of international concern and real-time dialogue among affected 
governments and WHO to propose real-time, evidence-based actions at borders; they also 
require countries to strengthen eight core capacities in public health aimed at more rapid 
detection and response to public health events where and when they occur.10 Although these 
requirements have not been met in all countries,11,12 the regulations provide an agreed 
global framework for enhancement of collective health security—a framework for 
investment by countries and development agencies to strengthen public health so that 
outbreaks caused by infectious organisms such as Ebola can be rapidly detected and 
contained.
Although the International Health Regulations are aimed at mitigating and preventing 
collective health risk, they do not provide for access to goods and health services. This gap 
was put to the test in 2007 when the Indonesian Government stopped sharing information 
about avian influenza virus strains with the international community, as required under the 
regulations, after it had made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a vaccine that was based on 
the virus strain it had provided to the international surveillance network for influenza.13 
This action resulted in a gap in knowledge about novel influenza viruses, and a threat to 
collective health security.
Attention was therefore called to the need to address the health security of individuals in 
Indonesia and elsewhere—access to an avian influenza vaccine in case of need. This event 
led to the doctrine of equal benefits from equal sharing, and after several years of inter-
governmental negotiation led to a pandemic influenza preparedness framework that loosely 
governs sharing of novel influenza viruses and access to the resulting vaccine and other 
products.14,15
Unlike the International Health Regulations, the global framework for pandemic influenza 
preparedness is not binding—and it has been developed in part because of the need to 
overcome a blockage to collective risk assessment and health security. Its primary goal for 
many negotiating countries was to again ensure virus sharing for collective risk assessment; 
for many of them, increasing access to vaccines was a secondary and spin-off benefit to 
developing countries.
Smallpox was regarded as a collective health security risk during the mid-20th century as the 
colonial period drew to a close. Eradication removed the threat to collective health security 
of naturally occurring smallpox; it was accomplished because national eradication 
programmes had provided access to a vaccine for all people at risk.
A final threat to health security is bioterrorism, shown to be a reality in 2001 in the USA 
where anthrax spores were distributed through the postal system to place the health security 
of targeted individuals, and whole populations in contact with the postal system and infected 
letters, at risk.16 Foreseeing these risks in the mid-20th century, the Biological Weapons 
Convention was developed and came into force in 1975.17
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Another outcome of smallpox eradication was to further enhance individual health security, 
through a movement to provide vaccines to children at risk of childhood communicable 
diseases. The Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI), established by WHO and 
UNICEF in the late 1970s, was not developed to provide a vaccine as a means to protect 
collective health security. It was established to save the individual lives of children.18 EPI 
now provides sustained vaccine supplies to countries at minimum or no cost, and prevents 
tetanus, pertussis, measles, diphtheria, and polio in countries where health systems 
successfully deliver these vaccines. One of these diseases, polio, is now scheduled for 
eradication. Access to polio vaccine has thus satisfi ed an individual health security need and 
at the same time led to herd immunity, which has enhanced collective health security by 
eliminating polio in all but three countries, and will hopefully lead to eradication.19
The GAVI Alliance followed the establishment of EPI and provides newer vaccines to 
countries. Development agencies have continued to contribute to GAVI for the health 
security of individuals without the need to justify vaccination as a requirement for collective 
health security.
At the time of revision of the International Health Regulations in 2005,10 smallpox was 
thought to remain a collective health security risk because of fears by some countries that 
the smallpox virus could be weaponised and used to create terror. Smallpox is now included 
in the regulations as a specific collective health security risk to be assessed and responded to 
immediately if reported, as are other infectious organisms that are thought to have 
bioterrorism potential. Fear for collective health security has resulted in vaccines, medicines, 
and other materials for smallpox and other infections being stockpiled in some countries, 
and in an ongoing debate among health ministers at the World Health Assembly over 
whether and when the samples of smallpox virus being held at secure laboratories in Russia 
and the USA should be destroyed.
Research and development programmes for medicines, vaccines, and treatments against 
these feared infectious organisms are also underway. It is thus that candidate vaccines, 
drugs, and monoclonal antibody preparations have been developed for Ebola. Access to 
those that are effective will be a major challenge to ensure health security for individuals 
living in regions vulnerable to Ebola outbreaks, and those involved in outbreak containment.
It has not been quite so straightforward to address access to medicines for diseases that have 
no preventive vaccines, even though there are life-sustaining or curative drugs. Donation of 
drugs by the companies that produced them has ensured access for those at risk of low-
prevalence diseases such as onchocerciasis and leprosy and resulted in reduced prevalence,
20 but such donations were not forthcoming for high-prevalence infections such as 
tuberculosis and HIV, nor for malaria.
At the UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS in 2001 it was thought that 
AIDS “may pose a risk to stability and security if left unchecked”.21 This, the concurrent 
political movement to place health at the centre of economic development, and evidence 
provided by the Macroeconomics Commission on Health,22 all led to improved 
understanding of the need to provide medicines to mitigate these threats to economic 
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growth. The Global Drug Facility, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, and UNITAID were subsequently created to provide medicines to low-income 
countries at no cost. Even though the need to advance economic development and traditional 
security, rather than the need to improve individual health security, have been used to justify 
action in this area, these initiatives nonetheless provide access to medical goods and health 
systems for improved health security of individuals.
Lack of reliable access to health-related products and services is not the only factor that 
threatens individual health security. The access must be to safe and effective products and 
services. Threats to this include fake, substandard, or counterfeit medicines, and the growing 
problem of antimicrobial resistance. These issues need sustained solutions, and every year 
without them leads us to increased collective and individual health security risk.
Infectious organisms are not the only disease threats that cross national borders and affect 
collective health security, although they have been the ones on which the international health 
security architecture has concentrated in the past; the risk factors that are determinants of 
non-communicable diseases, facilitated by globalisation and associated trade,23,24 are also 
a threat to health security. For instance, rates of heart disease, diabetes, obesity, 
hypertension, and other non-communicable diseases have increased as countries have shifted 
from traditional lifestyles, in a world of cross-border trade and communications that 
influence personal choices that range from smoking to consumption of energy-dense 
processed foods.25,26 Recently there has been effective national and global action to 
combat some of these threats. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which came 
into force in 2005, has resulted in increased taxation on cigarettes as a means of decreasing 
the risk that tobacco causes to the health,27 and the health security, of individuals. Similarly, 
there are increasing calls to protect individuals from what has been termed the obesogenic 
environment through measures such as regulation and legislation.28–30
Finally, other less understood but important risks to health security include chemical and 
nuclear weapons— and these are likewise being addressed through mechanisms such as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention,31 which came into force in 1997.
In summary, health security from infectious organisms, from the risk factors of non-
communicable diseases, and from chemical and nuclear hazards has two intertwined 
components—collective and individual. In some instances addressing individual health 
security—ensuring access to vaccines or medicines for example, or decreasing the risk of 
beginning to smoke cigarettes—leads to collective health security. Vaccinations increase 
collective health security through herd immunity and decreased risk of infection, and the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which aims at increasing the number of people 
who do not smoke, helps to protect population groups from the detrimental health effects of 
passive smoking. Other treaties protect individuals and societies from deliberate threats to 
health security from chemicals and nuclear fallout.
A final challenge is ensuring the health security of refugees and those living in conflict and 
post-conflict situations, who often face these same health security risks, as well as other 
risks associated with interruption of access to health services or violence. This challenge 
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needs additional study and resolution. Existing international regulations, treaties, 
conventions, and other means of ensuring stronger health security must be sustained, and 
new ones developed to address their specific needs. The International Health Regulations put 
in place a framework under which the world can work together to better ensure collective 
security and develop and strengthen core capacity in public health through development 
assistance and national funding; treaties such as the conventions on tobacco control and 
biological and chemical weapons are in place that protect individual health security and 
provide sustainable models for the future. Donations and global funds that increase access to 
vaccines, medicines, and health services might be less sustainable as conceived, and longer-
term solutions must be sought that include affordable goods and a will of countries to budget 
for and sustain their own procurement and health systems. This aim needs national skills and 
economic development; and technology transfer, price negotiation, intellectual property 
considerations, and continued innovation and ingenuity at the global level. There is a long 
way to go to ensure both individual and collective health security.
Ebola: lessons in human security
Lincoln Chen, Keizo Takemi
What is the true scope of global health security? David Heymann makes the distinction 
between collective health security and individual health security. Health security of 
populations has deep historical roots traced back to quarantine against plague in the 14th 
century to the more recent revisions of the International Health Regulations10 that promote 
core capabilities for rapid detection and timely response. Individual health security, 
according to Heymann, surfaced with the 2007 Indonesian withholding of avian influenza 
strains, insisting that poor countries be able to share in the benefits of the vaccines developed 
for rich markets. He argues that individual health security is dependent on access to 
vaccines, drugs, and health services. The Ebola crisis illuminates these two intertwined 
aspects of health security—individual security sums up to collective security, and collective 
security means enhanced individual security.
This bifurcated approach to health security constitutes only one of many perspectives on the 
scope of global health security. Health security itself constitutes only one part of a broader 
set of human security concerns. What can we learn about Ebola and health security from a 
broader and more comprehensive understanding of human security?
Useful insights can be gained from the UN Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by 
Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, that issued its report Human Security Now in 2003.32 The 
Commission adopted a comprehensive approach to human security, including but not only 
confined to health. Several core features of the Commission’ s findings and recommendations 
are worth revisiting in light of the Ebola crisis.
First, the Commission underscored that human security, including health security, is people 
centred. People-centeredness is important because, irrespective of the threat, what matters is 
people—not borders, not international relations, not even money and economics. A people-
centred approach might seem obvious today, but Cold War preoccupation with nuclear 
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conflict had transformed the concept of security overwhelmingly into military defence of 
national borders. Yet, as underscored by the Commission, there are many threats to human 
security such as extreme poverty and deprivation that threaten human survival and 
wellbeing.
Second, the Commission recognised that multi-dimensional security threats are interactive. 
Threats to security were broadly categorised as infectious epidemics, poverty and inequality, 
and violence-conflict-humanitarian crises-weak governance. As Ebola has vividly 
demonstrated, the economic and political effect of an infectious outbreak can be 
catastrophic.33 Other insecurities such as conflict and poverty can heighten vulnerability to 
infectious epidemics. A mutually reinforcing vicious cycle of insecurities could greatly 
magnify the net damage. The interactive nature of multiple threats challenges the breadth 
and duration of responsive actions, beyond simply containing an infectious agent.
Third, the Commission concluded that human security needs not only protection against 
downward risk, but also the sharing of upward gains. This in essence was the source of the 
Indonesian refusal to share influenza samples unless there would be some sharing of benefits 
of new vaccines. Ebola illuminates not only the importance of protecting people’ s lives 
through disease control but also of the essentiality of a strong health-care system embedded 
in a prosperous economy and a peaceful society. Even as current control efforts attempt to 
reach zero cases, there is the reminder that our failure to share the benefits of global 
economic growth leaves many societies without a health-care system, thus vulnerable to the 
devastating effect of Ebola and yet another epidemic. The Ebola crisis exposed inequity in 
global development that ultimately shapes societal vulnerability and empowers communities 
and organisations to respond effectively.
Finally, the Commission proposed a dual strategy of bottom-up empowerment balanced with 
top-down policies. Ebola demonstrates vividly that community perceptions, human 
behaviour, willingness to report, and compliance with control measures are all key 
parameters in effective disease control. Local cultural practices such as burials, church 
groups, and community-based organisations are part of the building of trust essential to 
combat an epidemic.34 Empowered communities—with education, good health, adequate 
income, and health knowledge—are better able to diagnose and respond to their own crises. 
Equally important are effective top-down actions. Like a fire brigade, the top-down global 
responses to Ebola must link effectively to local action. Yet, the plethora of global responses 
have been found wanting. The sentinel warnings of non-governmental organisations and the 
heroism of international volunteers have been heart-warming, but criticisms of inadequate 
and delayed action by international agencies, especially WHO, have been wake-up calls. 
Yet, WHO is an under-resourced and undermandated intergovernmental organisation where 
member states insist on preserving their absolute sovereignty in a world where viruses do 
not respect political borders or authority.
Ebola will not be the last new and lethal pathogen to emerge. In today’ s globalising world, 
we have new contexts for infectious pandemics—larger human populations, unprecedented 
volume of transnational movement, rapid travel, and growing global inequalities in 
economics and health. What makes Ebola different from the many other epidemics is the 
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fear of contagion that the lethal disease has precipitated among the public, especially in rich 
countries. When the rich and powerful feel threatened, global political priorities are 
accordingly redirected.
The global health community should address future threats to health security 
comprehensively based on deeper understanding of prevention and remediation of human 
security. Simply taking the International Health Regulations to a next step would be too 
weak and too narrow an adjustment. We live in a globalising world where health 
interdependence is greater than ever. There is still a window of opportunity to respond more 
effectively and comprehensively to the wake-up calls. Ultimately, in a genuinely egalitarian 
world, health security for all must be based on global equity, solidarity, and social justice.
The Ebola outbreak and the future of global health security
David P Fidler
A seminal change in global health during the past 20 years involved the framing of specific 
health problems as security threats and development of a strategy to achieve global health 
security. This strategy connected global health with core political interests of states, 
transformed the responsibilities of WHO, and produced the revised International Health 
Regulations.10 However, the outbreak of Ebola virus disease in west Africa damaged the 
strategy’ s political, institutional, and legal pillars. It revealed countries’  lack of political 
commitment, battered WHO’ s credibility, and weakened the International Health 
Regulations. Resurrection of global health security will need restoration of each pillar. 
Unfortunately, the damage exposes challenges that states previously have failed to handle, 
including sustaining global health as a political priority, reforming WHO, and improving 
compliance with international health law. In view of the difficulty of what is needed, 
whether the Ebola outbreak can rejuvenate global health security is far from clear.
How Ebola went from “an exotic tropical disease to a priority for global health security”35 
involves a backstory in which WHO and its member states built and then undermined the 
strategy for global health security. Starting in the mid-1990s, WHO crafted new approaches 
to dangerous disease events, such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
(GOARN)36 and the revised International Health Regulations. Outbreaks, including SARS 
and pandemic influenza H1N1, tested these innovations. In 2010–11, the International 
Health Regulations Review Committee analysed the H1N1 pandemic, acknowledged 
positive features of the response, and identified problems with the regulations and WHO’ s 
ability to address health emergencies. Warning “the world is ill-prepared” to handle any 
“sustained and threatening public-health emergency”, the Committee recommended 
improving compliance with the regulations and WHO’ s capacities to manage dangerous 
disease events.12
WHO did not adopt these recommendations. Concerns about global health security informed 
WHO’ s reform process, which started in 2010, but the process failed to support the Review 
Committee’ s recommendations or strengthen WHO’ s responsibilities in this area. The 2012 
deadline for meeting obligations on surveillance and response capacities in the International 
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Health Regulations passed with most countries not in compliance.37 The Review Committee 
also flagged this issue,12 but WHO’ s reform process did nothing about it. When fiscal 
difficulties forced decisions about priorities, WHO cut funding and staffing for its 
surveillance and response activities,38 rejecting Review Committee proposals for 
strengthening them.12 The cuts reflected WHO’ s strategic choice to de-emphasise global 
health security and increase attention on problems outside the global health security realm, 
including non-communicable diseases. The reform process also failed to tackle long 
recognised problems with WHO’ s regional and country offices that undermine the 
organisation’ s effectiveness.
This backstory reveals the rise and fall of global health security before the Ebola outbreak. 
Once catalytic in making global health more prominent in world affairs, the global health 
security strategy suffered political neglect by countries, downgrading within WHO, and legal 
non-compliance—before a single Ebola case appeared in west Africa. Although countries 
responded when the Ebola crisis teetered on catastrophe, the scale of the tragedy and the 
needed response highlighted the lack of political commitment seen before this outbreak.
For WHO, leadership failures, problems with regional and country offices in Africa, weak 
surveillance and response capacities, and incompetent staff made the Ebola outbreak a 
debacle.39 The UN stripped WHO of leadership in creating the UN Mission for Ebola 
Emergency Response, which implemented an approach unsustainable for long-term global 
health security. WHO’ s mistakes during the outbreak were bad enough, but, combined with 
its pre-outbreak actions, the disaster for WHO as the institutional pillar for global health 
security is much worse.
The Ebola crisis also hammered the International Health Regulations. The lack of health 
capacities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone highlighted the dismal compliance with the 
regulations’  surveillance and response obligations and the absence of any multilateral 
strategy or funding to address this problem in low-income countries. Many countries 
imposed trade and travel measures that lacked scientific and public health justifications, and 
few bothered to explain their actions.40 This behaviour violated the regulations, producing a 
different epidemic of legal non-compliance.
Despite the damage, the Ebola outbreak has resuscitated interest in global health security. 
The WHO Executive Board now supports proposals that the Review Committee made years 
ago.41 However, the rise, fall, and Ebola-related bruising of global health security mean that 
a renaissance needs deeper political commitment by states, extensive reform of WHO, and 
significantly improved compliance with the International Health Regulations. Achievement 
of such commitment, reform, and compliance constitutes a formidable challenge for global 
health policy.
From a position before the Ebola outbreak of downgrading the priority of global health 
security, WHO members must suddenly move in the opposite direction of trying to 
strengthen it. The outbreak revealed how inadequately countries supported the global health 
security strategy before this crisis. Transformation of national interests will prove difficult. 
Epidemics exhibit political elasticity—they increase global health’ s political importance, but 
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this effect fades as crises pass. As noted above, marginalisation of global health security 
accelerated after the H1N1 pandemic, and influenza pandemics are the most feared threat to 
global health security. How an Ebola outbreak in post-conflict societies in west Africa can 
embed global health security more firmly in national interests than previous, and more 
dangerous, disease crises did is not self-evident.
Ebola-generated proposals also envision a daunting institutional and legal reform agenda, 
which includes the emergency reserve force and contingency fund ideas, reconfiguring 
WHO’ s governance architecture, and giving the International Health Regulations “more 
teeth”.42 This agenda asks states to accomplish things they have failed historically to do: 
seriously reform WHO, sufficiently fund WHO’ s expanding responsibilities, provide 
sustained assistance to help low-income countries to build public health capacities, and 
accept enforceable rules of international health law. Why the Ebola outbreak will cause 
countries to reform WHO, fund global health priorities adequately, and enforce international 
health law has not been explained in the clamour for change.
Once upon a time, global health security was an innovative idea that produced a strategy 
resulting in historic changes in global health politics, governance, and law. After the Ebola 
outbreak, the novelty is gone, WHO is discredited, the changes have proved inadequate, and 
the strategy is in shambles. Repair of the political, institutional, and legal pillars of the 
global health security strategy has to involve institutional, financial, and legal actions that 
countries have been unwilling to take in the past, no matter what disease crisis recently 
happened. For global health to escape this pattern of behaviour after Ebola would need a 
transformation in global health politics beyond what made global health security a seminal 
change years ago. In view of the nadir global health security has reached, such a 
transformation is a very tall order. The future of global health security has never been more 
uncertain.
Global health security agenda: building resilient public health systems to 
stop infectious disease threats
Jordan W Tappero, Mathew J Thomas, Thomas A Kenyon, Thomas R Frieden
Infectious diseases have threatened health security since the beginning of civilisation. As 
exploration, trade, and warfare spread, so did disease. Geographical dissemination of disease 
became much more pronounced as the sailing vessel gave way to steamship and the oceans 
were no longer the barriers they had once been. As cultural and ecological frontiers were 
crossed, populations were exposed to unfamiliar infections from foreign lands. Within 50 
years of the Spanish conquest, an estimated 90% of the central Mexican population died 
from smallpox.43 There are also examples of the deliberate use of pathogens as weapons 
and as agents of bioterrorism, including the use of smallpox by British forces against Native 
Americans during the American colonial conflict,44 and use of anthrax spores targeting 
members of the US Congress and media in 2001.16 Today’ s mobility and commercial air 
travel has accelerated the shared global risk, and consequent fear, of the rapid, inadvertent, 
or intentional introduction of an emerging pathogen or biological agent.
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The Ebola epidemic has shown how connected we are as a global community; we are only 
as safe as the most fragile states. Ebola will not be the last infectious disease threat that we 
face—other recent examples include HIV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, 
H1N1 influenza, and SARS. Population growth, encroachment on previously sparsely 
populated areas in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, civil unrest and conflict, natural disasters, 
and the increasing density of urban areas in the developing world are being amplified in 
many of the most vulnerable corners of the world; the frequency of outbreaks and epidemics 
might well increase.45,46 Thus, we can expect infectious diseases to continue to emerge and 
re-emerge unpredictably in places where we are not looking—or simply cannot see because 
of lack of adequate, resilient public health surveillance systems and infrastructure.
In 2005, WHO revised its International Health Regulations to better address emerging 
epidemic threats such as the 2003 international outbreak of SARS.10,47 However, by the 
self-imposed deadline of June, 2012, fewer than one in five member states had even self-
reported full compliance with the regulations.48 On Feb 13, 2014, the USA along with 28 
partnering nations, WHO, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO), and the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) launched the Global Health Security Agenda 
(GHSA).49 GHSA was developed to advance International Health Regulation 
implementation through focused activities to strengthen core capacities, and to ensure “a 
world safe and secure from global health threats posed by infectious diseases—where we 
can prevent or mitigate the impact of naturally occurring outbreaks and intentional or 
accidental releases of dangerous pathogens”.50 More than three dozen countries have made 
firm commitments to working collectively across 12 GHSA technical targets.
The GHSA provides a framework and path with clear targets and milestones to accelerate 
progress in strengthening of public health systems needed to protect global health security. 
A resilient health system to stop naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease has the 
same attributes needed to prevent, detect, and respond to the deliberate use of a biological 
agent. These include a national biosecurity system that ensures that especially dangerous 
pathogens are secured with biosafety and biosecurity best practices in place, a nationwide 
laboratory network with a specimen referral system reaching at least 80% of its population 
and with effective modern diagnostics in place to detect epidemic-prone diseases, a timely 
biosurveillance electronic reporting system meeting WHO, OIE, and FAO requirements, a 
dedicated workforce of medical and public health professionals including at least one trained 
field epidemiologist per 200 000 population, and a public health emergency operations 
centre with the capacity to coordinate an effective emergency response within 120 min.50 If 
there is one thing we have learned about preparedness, it is that the most effective systems 
are those that are in use every day and can be scaled up in an emergency.
The GHSA targets are crucially important. The west African Ebola epidemic has not been 
limited to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. There have been inadvertent introductions 
from the affected countries to Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Spain, and the USA.51–55 These 
importation events were quickly controlled and these countries remain Ebola free. Had 
systems been in place in the west African countries, the past year would have looked very 
different. Although the threat of Ebola importation contributed to preparation of an effective 
response, the other countries already had components of the GHSA in place, and although 
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not fully developed it showed that even nascent capacity was crucial in facilitation of a 
timely response. In Nigeria, a dedicated public health emergency operations centre for polio 
eradication and a cadre of Field Epidemiology Training Program-trained56 epidemiologists 
facilitated the multisectoral coordination and extensive contact tracing efforts needed to 
control the outbreak once it spread as it spread within Lagos, and from Lagos to a second 
city.51 A common theme in quelling the Ebola importation events has been the ready 
availability of trained ministry of health staff who used existing surveillance systems, 
laboratories, and public health emergency operations capabilities to quickly control Ebola. 
Unfortunately, there remain far too many blind spots around the globe where public health 
systems lack trained disease detectives, functional laboratories, and quality surveillance data 
to make timely decisions about the use of resources to prevent, detect, and respond to 
infectious disease threats within their borders.
Attaining GHSA targets and achieving compliance with International Health Regulations is 
the foundation for making the world safer from infectious disease threats, but we must also 
strengthen our global infrastructure to respond to acute events that exceed national 
capacities. GOARN contributes to global health security by identifying, preparing and 
training, and rapidly providing international multidisciplinary experts to support the national 
response when assistance is requested.36 The network plays an important part in 
coordinating the work of international partners with national health authorities. In the 
response to Ebola in west Africa, specialists from GOARN partner institutions have taken 
part in more than 1250 deployments to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone since March, 
2014. GOARN clearly needs to become much stronger, faster, and better organised and have 
a broader set of skills. GOARN is planning enhancements that include an expanded network 
of partners, field leadership training for rostered participants, streamlined deployment 
processes, and field tools for outbreak response.
The moment for global public health systems development is now. GHSA is the opportunity 
to make rapid progress strengthening our collective health security through country and 
intercountry capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, both 
naturally occurring and intentionally released. One crucial activity is independent evaluation 
of progress at the country level (figure). Evaluation must be objective, transparent, simple, 
and meaningful, and findings must be used to mobilise human and financial resources to 
improve systems. Independent evaluation will be crucial to accelerate progress where it is 
needed most, and will facilitate global and country accountability for our shared health 
security fate.
The west African Ebola epidemic is a telling reminder that improvement of the capacity of 
every country to find, stop, and prevent health threats is both in the world’ s self-interest,57 
and a moral imperative.58
The effect of non-communicable diseases and population ageing on health 
security
Derek Yach, Sania Nishtar, Alex Kalache
Heymann et al. Page 13
Lancet. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 March 16.
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
Non-communicable diseases and mental health are major causes of death and disease in 
almost every country worldwide.59,60 Of the 38 million deaths attributable to non-
communicable diseases in 2012, more than 40% occurred among people younger than 70 
years.61 Despite the size of the problem, the current framing of health security focuses 
almost entirely on infectious diseases.62 Ebola reminds us of the effect of global 
interconnectivity on the spread of deadly diseases. Fear and dread about the short-term 
consequences of Ebola have stimulated a global response based on traditional public health 
measures.
We need to broaden the framing of health security to include non-communicable diseases. 
Prevalence of these diseases—with its high-cost implications—will undermine the ability of 
governments to implement universal health coverage. By contrast with most infectious 
diseases, and similar to HIV/AIDS, non-communicable diseases are rarely cured. They need 
lifelong management. Imaging, expensive diagnostic tests, and costly treatments are needed 
for decades, not weeks or months. The cumulative costs are set to soar in all countries as risk 
levels remain high and access to care increases.63 These unaffordable costs threaten 
individual and collective health security.
Incidence of non-communicable diseases, which is partly driven by globalisation of 
unhealthy consumption and lifestyles, explains the rapid rise in prevalence of many major 
non-communicable diseases. Five risk factors are common to several diseases: tobacco use, 
excess alcohol intake, unhealthful and high-calorie diets, physical inactivity, and 
unavailability of or non-adherence to medications to treat non-communicable diseases.
These risk factors are seen by many as freely adopted and an inevitable consequence of 
development. Non-communicable diseases are seen as age-related. That partly explains the 
paltry response to the overwhelming need. In reality, corporate interests related to tobacco, 
food, and alcohol hamper development of public health strategies. This effect has been best 
documented in respect to tobacco.64 Massive demands for urban infrastructure limit the 
ability of health experts to have their voices heard as new and expanding cities in Asia and 
Africa reduce levels of physical activity. Agricultural interests favour cash crops irrespective 
of their consequences for non-communicable diseases, food insecurity, or the environment.
65
Taken together, forces outside the direct control of health professionals are driving major 
demographic and epidemiological changes with substantial effects on health-care costs, 
public pensions, and social protection and security systems. Public health is ill-equipped to 
address such forces even as they threaten personal and collective health security.
Government leaders point to data that show life expectancy increasing in most countries. 
Age-specific declines in incidence of and mortality from non-communicable diseases in 
many countries indicate that all countries do better. Further, decades of trend data provide 
evidence that lives lived in good health lag behind improvements in life expectancy.66 This 
gap leads to increasing disability and severity of diseases as populations age, with profound 
implications for productivity, continued economic growth, and, indirectly, serious political 
implications. In recent months, the costs of unhealthy ageing and how to address the 
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consequences has emerged in macroeconomic debates in Greece, Singapore, Japan, and the 
USA. In all cases the options are becoming core to political debates.
Two highly age-dependent disease categories, musculoskeletal disease and dementia, are set 
to impose massive financial and human burdens on society at a time when evidence of 
effective prevention or care remains scant.67 In 2013, dementia affected an estimated 44·4 
million people worldwide, and the prevalence is expected to almost triple by 2050 to 135·5 
million.68 The cost of dementia-related care is more than US$600 billion—equivalent to the 
18th largest economy in the world today.
Life expectancy gains have been achieved through building of economies and businesses that 
led to unprecedented improvements in the quality and quantity of life, but these economies 
are based on the extensive use of non-renewable resources that have pushed us beyond many 
environmental limitations.69 Continued improvement in longevity therefore cannot be taken 
for granted, nor can we assume that massive gaps in health outcomes can be closed through 
“more of the same” policies that worked to propel 33 countries to now have life expectancies 
greater than 80 years at birth.70
Just as we now have serious debates about the need to change our consumption patterns in 
advanced industrialised countries to become healthier and more sustainable, these very 
lifestyles are promoted as desirable and aspirational in low-income and middle-income 
countries. This lifestyle, first popularised in tobacco advertisements of the 1950s in the USA 
and Europe, places ubiquitous use of tobacco, alcohol, and fast food at the core. Globalising 
dietary patterns that favour meat and calorie-rich nutrient-poor diets at the cost of healthier 
ones; or favour driving over walking, cycling, and public transport; or fail to clamp down on 
tobacco use and excess alcohol intake, are already eroding the global health gains achieved 
by dramatic declines in infectious diseases and undernutrition. They are also translating to 
significant threats to personal, family, and national health security.
Change will not be easy, particularly because low-income and middle-income countries 
aspire to the consumption patterns that have enhanced life’ s prospects and now threaten their 
health. Public health leaders have more to learn from the current global debate about climate 
change, which at its centre faces the same resistance to change, than from those addressing 
infectious disease control. That debate needs deeper insights into the real politic of change 
possible within government (as opposed to the health department); substantially more 
sophisticated approaches to interaction with markets and corporations with a view to finding 
ways to make markets work for prevention and control of non-communicable diseases; and 
the establishment by leading non-governmental organisations of mutual accountability 
systems supported by global investors in ways that the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) has 
achieved. CDP investor initiatives—backed in 2015 by more than 822 institutional investors 
representing an excess of US$95 trillion in assets71—give investors access to a global 
source of year-on-year information to support long-term objective analysis. This information 
includes evidence and insight into companies’  greenhouse gas emissions, water use, and 
strategies for managing climate change, water, and deforestation risks.
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It is time we had an equivalent initiative to drive better health within corporations. Relying 
on governments alone to transform major corporations to address health has not proven 
useful to date except with respect to some aspects of tobacco control.72
Incidence and severity of non-communicable diseases is a function of personal, corporate, 
and government behaviour over our lifespan. When incentives and actions for each are 
aligned and explicitly addressed, progress could be fast. Achievement needs partnerships 
that extend well beyond those that are effective for Ebola and a clearer vision of the goal: 
longevity with a high quality of life for all.
Health security and rights in times of emerging health threats: towards a 
new way of doing essential health research and development
Piero L Olliaro, Peter Horby, Els Torreele
Faced with a public health emergency such as Ebola, timely and affordable access to 
effective diagnostics, medicines, and vaccines is crucial to provide an adequate response to 
this individual and collective health security issue, and is central to the realisation of the 
right to health.
The scarcity of health tools to respond to Ebola has attracted widespread attention now, but 
this is just the most recent illustration of the failing research and development model. 
Infectious diseases in general are marginalised; not only the aptly named neglected tropical 
diseases, but also antimicrobial resistance at large: from artemisinin-resistant malaria to 
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis and other resistant bacterial infections, including the so-
called superbugs haunting even the best equipped hospitals.73 Various non-communicable 
diseases that are not deemed profitable enough also fall in the same category.
But why do we not have adequate health tools for Ebola and other epidemic and emerging 
diseases, or a pipeline of drug candidates to combat the continuous threat of antimicrobial 
resistance? The most common answer is: it is a market failure. However, this explanation is 
too simplistic, and masks the real underlying cause: our current medical research and 
development system, which relies largely on pharmaceutical companies that respond to 
profit prospects rather than health needs, is de facto ill suited to address the world’ s health 
priorities, unless these coincide with major market opportunities. Which in the 21st century 
turns out rather the exception than the rule.
Without a health rights frame and public health leadership to guide research and 
development priorities to address people’ s health needs, our current model prioritises the 
development of blockbuster products that can be marketed to generate maximum sales, even 
if marginal or superfluous from a medical perspective. The current pharmaceutical research 
and development system produces much more me-too products than it delivers genuine 
medical innovation: 75% of new medicines reaching the market provide no added 
therapeutic value.74 Ironically, when they do, new drugs tend to be unaffordable, priced well 
beyond the capacity of people and health systems to pay, even in wealthy countries. A case 
in point is a recent hepatitis C drug priced at $84 000 in the USA for 12 weeks of treatment, 
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which has provoked both private insurers and government programmes to ration the 
treatment,75 while remaining totally out of reach for millions of people living with hepatitis 
C worldwide. This example illustrates how health security and the right to health are not 
only issues of concern for developing countries.
Too often, promising leads that would address public health priorities are not pursued. For 
instance, some candidate products for Ebola have been known for some time.76 The fact that 
they got even this far is because they have been largely supported by public funds, primarily 
from defence budgets during a time that Ebola was regarded as a potential bioweapon.77
More generally, billions of public money are invested in biological and medical research and 
more spent on buying the products of this research, thus financing both ends of our 
pharmaceutical innovation system. However this does not translate into health security 
because there is no governance to ensure that our biomedical research and development 
system responds to priority health needs and delivers affordable products. The profit-seeking 
rewards and incentives system that has permeated private and public biomedical research 
alike creates a culture of secrecy and competition for knowledge access that is detrimental to 
scientific progress and results in inefficient use of resources, unnecessary fragmentation, 
duplication, and delays. It also biases choices towards developing health products that 
represent the best commercial market opportunities.
Obviously, products destined for epidemic and emerging diseases and antimicrobial 
resistance do not fall in this category, and the chronic crisis we are facing shows why we 
need alternative ways to conduct and finance research and development that prioritise public 
health needs and where the primary payback is improved global health security and the 
fulfilment of the individual right to health. This scenario means shifting from a system in 
which essential health products are regarded as profitable commodities and it is left to the 
private sector to decide which ones to develop, to a system where medicines are deemed 
public goods, and where it is incumbent on the public sector to define the public health 
priorities, and to create a conducive environment for product research and development, 
approval, and rational use. A governance system is needed to prioritise product development 
according to unmet health needs, and mechanisms that will allow diagnostics, drugs, and 
vaccines to be developed without an immediate financial reward, but, as conditions might 
warrant, left on the shelves until the next outbreak occurs, or kept in reserve until bacteria 
become resistant to first-line therapies. This arrangement is by sharp contrast with the 
current motive of maximising sales, which leads to massive overuse of some drugs, and 
necessitates regulation of the way drugs are deployed, prescribed, and used for instance to 
minimise the misuse of crucial antibiotics and prolong their lifespan.78
The Ebola crisis offered an opportunity to pilot a different paradigm of health-needs-driven 
research and development,79 as a collective action under public leadership and primarily 
financed with public funds, allowing open access to data, resources, and research aids, 
building a shared evidence base of so far fragmented knowledge, mobilising the research 
community to contribute to problem solving through crowdsourcing, and managing 
creatively intellectual property for products to be available as public goods. Sadly, so far this 
has not happened; our current research and development ecosystem lacks the needed 
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leadership and governance to prioritise research, resulting in fragmentation, diverging 
priorities, controversies over study design,80 and now competition for access to study sites 
and patients.81
Despite best intentions, we were unprepared this time again to overcome the systemic 
deficiencies of our research and development model. Research and development and access 
to diagnostics, vaccines, and treatments are crucial to achievement of health security, and 
cannot be left to market forces. Public leadership, direction, and accountability are needed 
for creative rethinking of a research and development system that urgently needs to be fixed.
Substandard and falsified drugs: a threat to human and global security
Lawrence O Gostin, Margareth Ndomondo-Sigonda, Daniel Carpenter
In a world shaped ever more powerfully by transnational currents of disease, of treatments, 
and of trust and distrust, substandard and falsified drugs should be understood as a threat to 
human and global health security. That security is at the centre of the problem should not be 
in doubt, once we understand that everyone is at risk. Like infectious diseases themselves, 
substandard and falsified drugs transcend national boundaries. The fear of ineffective and 
unsafe treatments can spread contagiously, engendering distrust in the health system. From 
heparin in the USA to treatments for malaria, tuberculosis, and Ebola in Africa, substandard 
and falsified drugs pose formidable social, economic, and political challenges to health 
security.
Epidemic disease is now viewed through the lens of security ranging from the US GHSA to 
WHO’ s International Health Regulations. The unprecedented UN Security Council 
resolution declaring Ebola a threat to international peace and security demonstrates the 
political instability wrought by fast moving epidemics.82 Substandard and falsified drugs 
greatly undermine national and global capabilities to curb epidemic and endemic infectious 
diseases, as well as non-communicable diseases. Populations will always face health 
security risks, but the crucial point is that institutions must have the ability to regulate and 
bound those risks. The ubiquitous and highly profitable nature of the global trade in 
substandard and falsified drugs poses grave dangers, while eroding public confidence in 
governments and international institutions.
Emerging states and civil society often object to the broad descriptor “counterfeit” for all 
low quality drugs. Counterfeits are a narrow class of drugs that infringe on a registered 
trademark, which is a proprietary interest protected under intellectual property law. A 
preferred common language frames the challenge purely in public health terms: “falsified” 
drugs misrepresent a product’ s identity or source, or both; and “substandard” drugs fail to 
meet national specifications in accepted pharmacopoeia or the manufacturer’ s dossier.83
There is a dearth of high quality, comprehensive data for the prevalence of substandard and 
falsified medicines not only because of the underground, often criminal nature of this 
problem, but also due to inadequate national drug surveillance systems. WHO estimates that 
substandard and falsified medicines make up 10% of the global pharmaceutical trade, rising 
to 25% in low-income countries.84 In Africa alone, they kill 100 000 patients annually,85 
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with poor-quality malaria and tuberculosis drugs being of greatest concern.86 The 
disproportionate burden in low-income countries is attributable, in part, to ineffective 
regulatory and criminal justice systems.84 The poor also cannot afford branded or even 
generic drugs, so they purchase medicines in market stalls and in unscrupulous pharmacies, 
including on the internet.
Falsified medicines pose three overlapping risks that undermine human and global health 
security. First, they can contain hazardous ingredients, causing poisoning or overdoses. For 
example, in September, 2008, 84 Nigerian children died from acute kidney failure caused by 
industrial solvent diethylene glycol in teething syrup.87 Second, low-quality drugs are 
ineffective, so diseases progress, sometimes causing death. Believing they are being treated, 
patients can delay or forego medical attention. Third, drugs that contain subtherapeutic 
concentrations of active pharmaceutical ingredient breed antimicrobial resistance. The loss 
of an entire class of medicines (eg, antibiotics) threatens populations today and for future 
generations.
Beyond the human toll, substandard and falsified medicines pose substantial costs to 
national health systems. They strain regulatory and law enforcement agencies, undermining 
the rule of law itself. The sheer scale of low-quality drugs can stunt social and economic 
development, with the diminution of worker productivity, corruption of public officials, and 
foregone tax revenues as criminal cartels divert products from the legitimate drug supply.
Curtailing a problem of such global breadth needs mechanisms of action that span national 
boundaries, but remain largely within the regulatory powers of states. The drivers of 
substandard drugs include failure to meet good manufacturing practices (GMP). Although 
large pharmaceutical companies have the funding and incentives to meet GMP, small market 
companies often do not. They need training and equipment to meet international standards, 
and governments need regulatory structures to assess and assure quality. Although states 
must invest in safe and effective drugs, many need international assistance to close glaring 
gaps in manufacturing and regulatory capacities.
Empowered regulatory agencies can act against known manufacturers, but if products are 
falsely represented, the primary responsibility falls to customs and law enforcement. At 
present, falsified products are highly lucrative, with weak detection, enforcement, and 
criminal penalties. Sophisticated transnational criminal networks can produce illicit products 
that are very hard to differentiate from genuine products. They are highly skilled at 
manufacturing, packaging, distributing, and selling unlawful products—while avoiding 
regulatory oversight or police detection.
Even if national regulation and enforcement were adequate, states face a global enterprise 
beyond their reach. Yet, international criminal justice (UN Office on Drugs and Crime and 
International Criminal Police Organization), customs (World Customs Organization), and 
health (WHO) agencies have few tools and resources to stem the transnational trafficking in 
falsified drugs. There are no robust international agreements or transnational agencies to 
oversee drug quality, detect fraud, and apprehend bad actors.
Heymann et al. Page 19
Lancet. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 March 16.
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
Weak drug regulation and law enforcement at the national level combined with ineffective 
legal instruments and organisations at the international level enable traders in falsified drugs 
to prosper. When traffic in falsified drugs eludes the technologies and networks of regulatory 
detection, as in many developing countries, the problem is likely to grow and become more 
intransigent.
Enhanced pharmacovigilance and quality assurance compose two broad policy responses 
that are essential to coordinate across governments. WHO has developed a global 
monitoring system to define the magnitude of substandard and falsified products at the 
country, regional, and global level. The organisation is initiating a global network of focal 
points from national regulatory authorities and partnered civil society organisations to report 
suspected incidents.
Just as the International Health Regulations have identified core capacities, regulatory and 
enforcement capacities are vital to prevent, detect, and prosecute traders in substandard and 
falsified medical products. When criminals evade detection through porous borders, law 
enforcement cannot apprehend unlawful actors, and criminal justice meets out 
inconsequential penalties, then incentives for trade in falsified medicines will grow. 
Strengthening of inspection and enforcement capacities that interface among regulatory 
agencies and jurisdictions—customs, police, and courts on the one hand, and distribution 
networks, supply chains, clinics, and pharmacies on the other—is crucial.
The global stakes in substandard and falsified drugs are as high as they are because the very 
legitimacy of national health systems and international organisations is at stake. Substandard 
and falsified drugs have the potential to destabilise governments, affecting their functioning 
and credibility. This spiral of distrust manifests itself in the criminal networks and 
undermining of regulatory and criminal law, another driver of state failure. Substandard and 
falsified drugs pose a public health crisis not merely when epidemic disease spreads 
unabated or when treatment fails biologically, but also (and more enduringly) when the 
public and civil society lose confidence in national and global governance—a spiral of 
distrust caused by the failure to ensure a safe, effective supply of essential drugs and 
vaccines.
Conflict, disaster, and health security
Simon Rushton, Louis Lillywhite, Bhimsen Devkota
Violent conflict and natural disasters pose threats to individual and population health.88 
They damage and disrupt health systems, reduce treatment capacity and access, damage 
infrastructure, and preclude appropriate responses to acute health crises. The resultant health 
threats sometimes extend beyond the borders of the directly affected country. Promotion of 
health security therefore entails ensuring that effective health systems exist before a crisis, 
are sustained during and after conflict and disaster, and are at all times accessible to the 
population. The challenges facing health systems differ greatly between contexts, but always 
raise similar questions over how best to contribute to, or facilitate, efforts to provide safe and 
effective health services.
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Most contemporary conflicts occur in countries with weak health services,89 where 
infrastructure deficiencies are often compounded by ineffective governance and chronic 
shortages in finance and human resources. Low-income and lower-middle income countries 
are also disproportionately affected by natural disasters, comprising seven of the top ten 
countries in terms of disaster mortality incidence.90
The direct health effects of conflict and disaster on individuals (such as physical injury, 
mental trauma, or infectious disease) as well as the indirect effects (from displacement, 
famine, and other causes of insecurity) can be severe,91 often falling most heavily on 
women, children, and displaced and marginalised groups.92 They are highly destructive of 
health systems, via multiple mechanisms, including targeting of health facilities, loss of 
health professionals to death, injury, or emigration, disruption of governance structures and 
supply lines, and interruption of health campaigns, in addition to increased demands for 
care. In recent years conflict-affected countries have confronted serious infectious disease 
outbreaks including Marburg haemorrhagic fever in Angola in 200593 and a cholera 
epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda 
crisis.94 Thus, some of the world’ s weakest health systems find themselves facing some of 
the world’ s toughest health challenges. Ensuring that populations have access to effective, 
safe, and properly resourced health services—even during a conflict or disaster—is (or at 
least should be) a shared priority. Achievement of this aim is a complex task needing 
sustained domestic efforts and much international assistance.
Although many recent disasters have seen a high-profile humanitarian response, increasingly 
efforts are directed to preparation for, and reduction of the effect of, disasters. Resilience and 
risk reduction are evident in various current strategies including those of the UN95 and the 
UK Department for International Development.96 At the third UN World Conference on 
Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan, in March, 2015, a new Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015–2030 was adopted, which for the first time includes specific targets; 
however, whether or not these will attract international funding will have to await an 
international development financing summit in Ethiopia in July.97 Resilience is about much 
more than the health sector (for example, flood protection measures), but much can be done 
to ensure the continued functioning of health systems post disaster (eg, ensuring that 
hospitals are constructed to resist earthquakes).98
Nevertheless, disasters will on occasions necessitate regional and international assistance, 
but to be effective previous political and financial investment is needed to ensure that 
personnel and resources are available and able to be rapidly deployed. The Euro-Atlantic 
Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which operates 24 h per day, 7 days per week, and 
covers 50 countries, has responded to 60 requests for assistance since the late 1990s.99 
Globally, however, disaster response capacities are patchy. During the Ebola epidemic in 
west Africa several proposals have been made for the creation of a so-called rapid reaction 
body, although questions remain over whether WHO, the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, or some other agency should take primary responsibility.100 Whoever 
leads, it is essential that steps are taken to ensure that well intentioned international aid does 
not create additional problems. The response to the Haiti earthquake, for example, drew 
health workers away from the public health system, caused patients to preferentially use the 
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facilities provided by aid organisations, and introduced cholera into the country.101 Finding 
ways to anticipate and mitigate these negative effects should be a priority for donors and 
agencies.
Armed conflicts raise additional challenges. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
is currently campaigning against the deliberate destruction of health facilities and services.
102 Under international humanitarian law there is an expectation that health resources will 
be protected. In practice, they are often damaged. Investing in more training in these laws for 
all armed groups (state and non-state) might help to reduce both deliberate and non-
deliberate damage to health systems, but we also need to understand why belligerents target 
health systems in some cases and not others and why health indicators during some 
conflicts, such as Nepal,103 continue to improve while in other cases they fall.
The use of health services by belligerents to win hearts and minds can improve health 
coverage, but raises issues around the politicisation of health care and can increase 
inequalities in access or exacerbate intercommunity tensions.104 Dilemmas also arise in 
relation to non-state armed groups who might be the primary providers of health services in 
some areas.105 State and donor governments are often reluctant, or refuse, to work with 
those they characterise as terrorists. Humanitarian aid agencies, keen to maintain 
impartiality, have their own reasons for being concerned about engaging with belligerents. 
Yet there is a pragmatic argument for working with both the state and non-state armed 
groups who are engaged in health service delivery and, perhaps, for prioritising impartiality 
over neutrality and independence. This suggestion might seem far-fetched, but so initially 
did the proposals in the late 19th century that led to the Geneva Conventions that require 
impartial health care during international conflicts.
The end of conflict usually involves a formal peace process and here again attention needs to 
be given to health systems. Whereas political and security considerations often dominate 
(eg, arranging elections and demobilising combatants), more attention needs to be given to 
the negative effects on health and health services that continue after the fighting stops.106 
Dealing with the direct individual health effects (such as physical disability or post-
traumatic stress disorders) and the process of (re)constructing a health system are by their 
nature long-term endeavours. All parties to a peace process need to be engaged from an 
early stage in discussions on the post-conflict health system, including how health workers 
trained by the combatants in support of the conflict can be used post conflict. The failure to 
invest in the post-conflict health systems in west Africa has been identified as contributing to 
the size and effect of the current Ebola outbreak.107–109
These cases highlight several strategic challenges, including a smooth transition from short-
term humanitarian relief to longer-term development-oriented programmes; the need to 
effectively coordinate the activities of many domestic and international actors; and the fact 
that health system rebuilding is inextricably linked to broader issues of national capacity and 
good governance.
Setting of priorities and allocation of resources to mitigate the effect of, and recover after, 
conflict and natural disaster is a quintessentially political challenge, not merely a technical 
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one. Both individual and collective health security are intimately tied up with successfully 
meeting this challenge. The health community can advocate, advise, and contribute to these 
efforts, but an effective response needs high-level political commitment. It is to be hoped 
that the landmark UN agreements to be reached in 2015 (not least the post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals and climate change agreements) lead to substantial improvements in 
current capacities to deliver health services and products in conflict and disaster-affected 
environments. It is equally to be hoped that WHO is prepared to articulate the case for health 
system strengthening, to invest in identifying what works and what does not in cases of 
conflict and disaster, and to provide the health community with the leadership necessary for 
successful implementation.
International migration and global health security: five lessons from the 
Ebola crisis
Khalid Koser
There are many links between international migration and global health security, ranging 
from health-care disparities as a cause of migration, through the risk of a so-called brain 
drain of qualified health workers with implications for health-care provision in their origin 
countries, to heightened rates of mortality in refugee camps110 and restricted access to 
health care for unauthorised migrants,111 to the role of migrant remittances and diaspora 
doctors and nurses in responding to emergencies and contributing to the development of 
health-care systems at home.112 In safeguarding of global health security, it is therefore 
important to pay attention to migration.
In the context of the recent Ebola crisis, the main migration-related concern was that the 
crisis might trigger large scale migration, which in turn would become a vector for spreading 
the virus. In response most neighbouring countries tried to close their borders, industrialised 
countries such as Australia imposed temporary visa restrictions on all immigrants from these 
countries, and several airlines stopped flying to the affected countries. Yet evidence from 
previous health crises demonstrates that they rarely result in large scale international 
migration, that where they do travel bans do not always work, and that the unintended 
consequences of travel bans might be more harmful than the problem they are intended to 
address.113
There are five wider lessons to learn from these migration responses to Ebola, and their 
overall lack of effectiveness, for understanding the relation between international migration 
and global health security, and generating positive feedback loops. First, the Ebola crisis has 
reinforced that more research is needed on the effect of health crises on international 
migration, to inform more effective policy making. An historical review of health crises has 
indicated that they rarely result in large scale migration.114 When it has occurred, as for 
example from Beijing during the 2003 SARS outbreak, migration tends to be internal, 
temporary, and early on in the health crisis. It has been difficult to discern disease from other 
underlying factors such as poverty and persecution where international migration has 
occurred during health crises, for example during the cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe in 
2009.115 Overall the evidence is scarce, anecdotal, and hard to verify. Empirical challenges 
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involve identification of and access to affected populations; conceptual challenges include 
attribution and distinguishing of health from other motivations to migrate.
Second, increased efforts are needed to encourage states to abide by the International Health 
Regulations, and for organisations that work with migration and migrating populations to 
fully understand their potential to prevent migration related to health crises. The 
implementation of International Health Regulations, which takes a preventive approach to 
the international spread of disease, focusing less on control measures at borders than 
detection and response at source and on enabling global communication channels, appears to 
be one reason why health crises in recent years have not triggered mass migration. Fuller 
implementation of International Health Regulations in west Africa would have been a far 
more effective safeguard against migration than travel restrictions.
Third, more work is needed at national and global levels to ensure that populations are 
empowered to protect themselves from diseases, and to ensure that the mass media have the 
knowledge and understanding to contribute to health protection and understanding of risks 
and their management. In the review on health crises and international migration,112 
collective actions were also found to reduce the risk of disease and offer an alternative to 
fleeing. During the 2009 influenza H1N1 pandemic, for example, school closures, work 
pattern adjustment, self-isolation of symptomatic individuals and advice to their caregivers, 
and cancellation of mass gatherings helped to mitigate the pandemic.116 The gradual 
improvement of the understanding of infectious diseases, their causative agents, modes of 
transmission, and evidence-based ways to control their spread have also empowered 
individuals to adopt preventive behaviour, in many cases pre-empting migration.
Fourth, increased coherence is needed between the International Health Regulations and 
migration policies and practices at the national and international levels to inform 
government responses during health crises that help populations to avoid migration, and 
potentially pre-empting unwarranted decisions to close borders and to detain or deport 
migrants who have fled health crises. For example, where there are migrants either arriving 
from or faced with the prospect of returning to areas affected by health crises, national 
migration policies should allow for their specific assistance and protection, including the 
suspension of deportation orders until the health crisis has subsided. Respecting the rights of 
migrants and refugees also applies to their countries of origin: in 2014, Côte D’ Ivoire 
contravened international law by blocking the return of 400 refugees from Liberia, on the 
grounds that they might import the Ebola virus into the country.117 At the national level, 
increased coordination is needed between government agencies separately tasked with 
migration and health mandates.
One of the unintended consequences of travel restrictions in west Africa during the Ebola 
outbreak was to reduce the flow of health workers there, as well as the provision of medical 
supplies and humanitarian assistance. It was only once these restrictions were lifted, for 
example, that a team of 165 medical professionals from Cuba were able to enter Sierra 
Leone to help to step up the response to Ebola there.118 Finally, therefore, besides at times 
being a potential cause and consequence of global health insecurity, it is important to 
recognise that mobility can also be part of the solution.
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Universal health coverage and global health security
Rob Yates, Ranu S Dhillon, Ravi P Rannan-Eliya
The Ebola epidemic, termed “a threat to international peace and security” by the UN 
Security Council in September, 2014,82 has once again put the issue of health security at the 
top of the global agenda. Although traditionally conceptualised as protection from the 
pandemic spread of infectious diseases, health security, as David Heymann argues, does 
indeed need broader collective action to ensure that all people have “access to safe and 
effective health services, products, and technologies” they need to ensure their own 
individual health security. This expanded definition recognises that collective health security 
is also the sum of individual health security, and compels global action to provide 
individuals in all countries with access to essential health care.
A much deeper connection between individual health security and collective human security, 
not only collective health security, has been understood at least since the 1880s. It was then 
that Chancellor Otto von Bismarck linked Germany’ s national security to collective, state 
action to ensure the health and social security of individual workers.119 This linkage was 
asserted more generally in the 20th century, by the two architects of today’ s global security 
framework—Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt—who both accepted, as political 
liberals, the importance of building their own nations’  security on a strong foundation of 
shared social solidarity and emphasised the importance to global security of ensuring that all 
people in all nations should live in freedom from fear and want.120
Individual health security cannot be separated from this broader concept of human security 
that is concerned with all threats to human wellbeing. The availability of essential services, 
technologies, and medicines is not possible if financial and other barriers prevent individuals 
from accessing them when they are needed and health care is not made available in a 
socially equitable manner. Further, freedom from fear and want—the essence of human 
security—also means ensuring that all individuals have adequate protection against the 
financial risks of medical care, which in many countries remains a leading cause of poverty 
and threat to individual wellbeing.121
Universal health coverage is fundamentally about meeting these needs—universal, equitable 
access to health care with financial protection—and is indispensable for achievement of 
individual health security and, therefore, collective health and human security. Universal 
health coverage can only be achieved through collective action led by governments, both 
within their own borders and across borders when international cooperation is needed. A 
wider concept of health and human security in keeping with the original vision that created 
the UN Security Council is needed that acknowledges that global security is more easily 
achieved when, in all countries, all people can “obtain the health services they need without 
suffering financial hardship when paying for them”.122 This is the goal of universal health 
coverage.
Universal health coverage requires the adequate delivery of effective health services and for 
all people to have access to these services. Tackling of demand-side constraints is an 
essential part of universal health coverage and, in particular, entails ensuring that financial 
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cost is not a barrier to access that, if not overcome, can result in the underconsumption of 
services.
This requirement has profound implications for global health policy and, in particular, for 
how countries finance their health systems. Specifically, the financial protection objective 
embedded within universal health coverage implies that the burden of financing health care 
be distributed fairly across everyone in a society according to ability to pay, while protecting 
the sick. This scenario necessitates wealthier members of society contributing more than the 
poor. Global experience shows that maintenance of such an equitable system requires the 
state to play a major part in setting and enforcing laws compelling the healthy and wealthy 
members of society to subsidise services for the sick and the poor. As a result, universal 
health coverage can only be achieved with a heavy reliance on public financing mechanisms
—in particular through general taxation and compulsory progressive social insurance 
systems. This reliance was one of the major findings of the recent Lancet Commission on 
investing in health, which advocated for increasing public financing to reach universal health 
coverage through “progressive universalism”.123
In effect, the international response to the recent threat to global health security posed by the 
Ebola virus reflects this approach. In the absence of adequate public financing, the affected 
countries were not able to provide effective health coverage and were left extremely 
vulnerable to the shock caused by Ebola. The ensuing epidemic has severely compromised 
individual, national, and global health security. As the President of the World Bank has 
argued, this crisis would probably not have occurred in those African countries with 
demonstrably higher levels of effective health coverage.124
To counteract this threat to global health security, public financing from wealthy donor 
nations has financed universal coverage of Ebola-related services for individuals in these 
countries, for whom these services would have been totally unaffordable had they been 
available. One could argue that, in addition to efforts for smallpox, and then polio 
eradication, this response represents a rare example where the world has shown a real 
commitment to achievement of true universal coverage, such that everybody receives the 
services they need with the costs fully subsidised by globally pooled resources.
So why does universal health coverage matter to the wider goals of global health and human 
security and might it also have other benefits for development? First, if we consider the 
emergence of some infectious diseases of global concern (for example, artemisinin-resistant 
malaria, SARS, and Ebola), they occurred in settings without universal health coverage 
where health systems were unable to perform effective public health functions and deliver 
essential medical services, including hospital care for the grievously ill. In the current Ebola 
crisis, the longstanding lack of access to basic primary care, laboratories with insufficient 
capacity, and shortage of existing hospital infrastructure to isolate and treat infected people 
left communities with little trust in the health system, families with no help to tend for their 
seriously ill members, and fuelled the spread of the epidemic and its resulting death toll.
In an interconnected world, the availability of accessible and universal health-care services 
in all countries is the crucial first line of defence for all against such threats to health. 
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Instilling trust in communities needs access to health systems that provide a comprehensive 
breadth of essential health care. Communities do not compartmentalise their health issues 
into vertical pillars. If they cannot access quality maternal health or diabetes care, it erodes 
their faith in the same systems later pursuing them to manage Ebola and other infectious 
threats. Additionally, the health security threat of non-communicable diseases cannot be 
mitigated without provision of horizontally integrated primary care that can prevent, 
diagnose, and manage a wide range of illnesses. Unless all countries have effective universal 
health coverage, populations will also be inclined to travel across borders to seek care, 
increasing the potential for infection to spread and posing social and economic burdens and 
possible threats to law and order in other nations. Indeed, Ebola has been seeded and 
reseeded in the three countries most affected by the current epidemic as people moved 
across borders in search of social support and health care.125
Second, universal health coverage can substantially improve human security by providing 
financial security against impoverishing medical costs. In Thailand, for example, extension 
of health coverage to the entire population reduced annual impoverishment from medical 
costs from 2·71% of the population to 0·49% in 10 years.126 Achievement of the financial 
protection goal enshrined in universal health coverage can therefore be an effective strategy 
to reduce poverty and ensure human security.
Third, universal health coverage can strengthen national security by improving the social 
solidarity of the population. Fear and uncertainty concerning the financial consequences of 
ill health and inequitable access represent large welfare losses to populations.127 Concern 
about falling financial access to health services has sometimes resulted in political 
demonstrations and violent unrest.128 In responding to these pressures, some governments 
have launched socialised health financing reforms primarily to reduce political tensions and 
improve national security. This has been the case in China, where the architect of their 
recent health reforms suggested that his government’ s main motivation in achieving 
universal health coverage had been to bring about “a more harmonious society”.129
Therefore, as well as being a means to deliver improved health security, universal health 
coverage can also improve economic security for households, strengthen social solidarity 
systems resulting in improved national security, and has even been used to facilitate 
unpopular climate change policies.130 Advancement of the goal of universal health 
coverage can therefore simultaneously address several key development priorities, in 
addition to strengthening global health security. In view of these substantial economic, 
welfare, and political benefits, there is a strong case that universal health coverage should be 
regarded as a development goal in its own right.
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Key messages
• The Ebola virus disease crisis has drawn attention to the well recognised 
importance of reducing collective vulnerability to infectious disease threats 
that cross national borders, but also to a second, equally important aspect of 
health security that is less appreciated: individual health security. This 
security comes from personal access to safe and effective health services, 
products, and technologies.
• This conceptualisation constitutes only one of many perspectives on the scope 
of global health security, which constitutes only one part of a broader set of 
human security threats. Irrespective of the threat, what matters is the 
centrality of people—not borders, not economies, and not even international 
relations.
• The crisis revealed countries’  lack of political commitment to global health 
security, battered WHO’ s credibility and highlighted non-compliance with 
international health law. It has nonetheless resuscitated interest in global 
health security, but whether the epidemic can rejuvenate global health security 
as a prominent world affairs issue is unclear.
• The epidemic has shown how we are only as safe as the most fragile states 
and is a reminder that improvement of the capacity of every country to find, 
stop, and prevent health threats is both in the world’ s self-interest, and a 
moral imperative. Far too many blind spots remain around the world.
• Health security applies not only to infectious diseases, but also to non-
communicable diseases. The anticipated unaffordable costs of non-
communicable diseases threaten individual and collective health security.
• The Ebola outbreak is only the most recent illustration of how ill suited the 
medical research and development model is to addressing the world’ s health 
priorities. Research and development and access to diagnostics, vaccines, and 
treatments are crucial to health security, and cannot be left to market forces.
• Substandard and falsified drugs pose formidable social, economic, and 
political challenges to health security. They greatly undermine capabilities to 
curb both infectious and non-communicable diseases, while eroding public 
confidence in governments and international institutions.
• Setting of priorities and allocation of resources to mitigate the effect of, and 
recovery after, conflict and natural disaster is a quintessentially political 
challenge, not merely a technical one. Both individual and collective health 
security are intimately tied up with successfully meeting this challenge.
• In safeguarding of global health security, it is important to pay attention to 
migration. Fuller implementation of the International Health Regulations in 
west Africa would have been a far more effective safeguard against migration 
than travel restrictions. Action can be taken to reduce the risk of, or pre-empt, 
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unwarranted decisions to close borders and detain or deport migrants who 
have fled health crises.
• Collective health security is the sum of individual health security, and 
compels global action to provide individuals in all countries with access to 
essential health care. Universal health coverage—universal, equitable access 
to health care with financial protection—is indispensable for achievement of 
individual health security and, therefore, collective health and human security. 
In effect, the international response to the Ebola outbreak reflects this 
approach.
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Figure. Mock country dashboard for periodic independent assessments of progress made 
towards Global Health Security Agenda targets
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